Merz in NATO: a snapshot on the state of the transatlantic relationship

The new German Chancellor states he is more optimistic than two months ago on America's role in the defence of Europe.

Earlier today, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and NATO SG Mark Rutte held a joint press conference at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This was an important opportunity for the new Chancellor to lay out his key priorities and to convey essential messages to the public.

At the political level, Merz’s remarks suggested a clear improvement in the state of transatlantic relations. As highlighted by a journalist during the press conference, Merz had been especially vocal - by the standards of a leading European politician - on concerns that the United States could no longer be viewed as a close and reliable ally and guarantor of European security. Today, Merz struck a different tone and said explicitly that he was “more optimistic” now that he had been two months ago.

This is an important data point. While European leaders would rationally tend to play down the severity of America’s potential disengagement from Europe (in the hope that they could delay it or diminish it), it is quite different to choose to say openly and clearly that one is more optimistic than before.

Interestingly, Merz decided to use traditional language to describe America’s importance in the collective defence of Europe - referring to America as indispensable (“unverzichtbar”) and expressing the view that America’s engagement in the defence of Europe should continue not just in the short-term but also in a long-term perspective.

This development should be viewed in the context of wider European efforts, most notably by America’s older allies in Western Europe, to rescue the relationship through a combination of defence spending increases and active diplomatic outreach. In recent months, and each in their own way, the UK, Belgium, Spain, and Italy have all announced defence spending increases and a renewed commitment to NATO and to the Transatlantic relationship.

This is obviously worth the effort: if America were to disengage in a serious manner, Europeans would be forced to massively increase their defence spending efforts, but if America stays in, the Trump Administration has made it clear it expects high defence spending efforts as well. And in any case, with or without America, the hard reality is that Russia’s military potential is - in certain areas at least - absolutely considerable and a serious threat to all of Europe. Therefore the only robust policy course of action here is thus to make the new efforts in a serious manner while asking America to remain involved. This should be viewed as more than just damage limitation: it involves embracing change while hoping to retain the advantages of the past.

The questions then become: what change, how much change, how quickly, for what cost, and with what trade-offs. In short order, I posit the following based on the remarks made by Chancellor Merz and SG Rutte: